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 Kenya’s information and communication technology (ICT) sector has 
witnessed a dramatic turnaround. Barely 20 years ago, in the mid-1990s, 
the sector was an irritant to the political system and was best discussed 
by geeks in hushed tones. Th e political system saw emerging ICTs as an 
aff ront to challenge its leaders’ power and control over information fl ow. 
Such was the environment that the fi rst eff orts to introduce the Internet 
in Kenya, in 1995, were met with an offi  cial rebuff  through a full- 
page advertisement by the then Kenya Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation (KP&TC), a monopoly state enterprise, declaring that 
Internet services amounted to resale, and were therefore illegal. It was 
in this harsh environment that the Internet was born in Kenya. In short 
order, it was banned entirely in the government civil service until 1999. 
 In such an environment, the Internet was only for brave nongov-
ernment organizations (NGOs), geeks, and small companies with 
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 international business interests. Indeed, none of the universities had 
Internet connections. Concerted advocacy changed the tide, and by 1997, 
the government promulgated the Telecommunication and Postal Sector 
Policy recognizing ICT’s contributions to development, and by 1999, 
passed the Kenya Information and Communication Act, a new telecom 
law establishing a multi-operator environment—followed shortly there-
after by offi  cial recognition of the Internet. However, the market still had 
to endure a monopoly international gateway through the state-owned 
incumbent operator for another seven years, till 2007. 
 Th e Telecommunication and Postal Sector Policy had envisaged 
a national teledensity (i.e., telephone lines per 100 people) of 5 % by 
2015. But in fact, rapid growth realized a teledensity of fully 88 % by 
September 2015 (Communications Authority of Kenya  2015 ). 
 In the two decades before 2015, the sector came of age, and so did the 
institutions driving the Internet. Today, the Government of Kenya has 
now fully embraced the Internet and ICTs as drivers of socioeconomic 
growth and, in a very bold move, established a high-level agency to main-
stream e-government as a tool for governance and for reaching out and 
interacting with the nation’s citizens. Working with various stakeholders, 
the government has even promulgated a national ICT policy that actively 
envisages national growth driven by ICTs. 
 Slowly but surely, new and revolutionary technologies and business 
processes have come into the market, disrupting older technologies and 
business processes. Th e policy and regulatory framework has had to give 
way to respond to the new environment, and fi nally, the early actors have 
had to give way to new actors. Indeed, none of the key actors from 20 
years ago exist in 2015. KP&TC, for example, has given way to Telkom 
Kenya, which is quite diff erent from the old monopoly, KP&TC. 
 Th e evolution is profound. At the technology level, Kenya has moved 
from offl  ine store-and-forward (FidoNet) technologies and reliance on 
copper for connectivity to cellular, and now, to fi ber optics. Similarly, 
the bandwidths of 2015 would have been inconceivable two decades ago. 
In September 1995, Kenyan Internet users shared 32 Kbps to serve the 
entire country—a far cry from the 1.7 Gbps available 20 years later. From 
the international NGOs who introduced email, Internet service is for 
the masses today and is used by many in daily activities. Th e Kenyan 
 government, which through KP&TC was dead set against email and 
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Internet and banned it in government services, is now a key promoter of 
a digital future for Kenya. 
 Th e net eff ect is that the Internet is widely available and much cheaper, 
with applications for numerous aspects of daily life. Still, 26 % of Kenyans 
are not using the Internet for various reasons, including gender disparities 
in access and use, aff ordability, content relevance, and basic access. Th is 
chapter attempts to document the disruptions that have brought Kenya 
this far over the past 20 years and to explore lessons that can help guide 
the nation over the coming 20 years—while addressing new frontiers that 
have not so far benefi ted from the rise of the Internet. 
 Evolution of ICTs 
 Th e evolution of ICTs has been very fast and has aff ected all stakehold-
ers—users, operators, and the government. Th e following phases can be 
discerned in the evolution of ICTs in Kenya and the role of civil society 
organizations (CSOs):
•  Phase 1 Before 1994, electronic communications other than email 
were hardly known. Users were largely international NGOs for inter-
national communications. Email service providers relied on upstream 
Internet service providers (ISPs) based abroad to poll its servers once 
or twice a day to collect and deposit mail. Th e upstream ISPs distrib-
uted the mail globally. Because of the high cost of leased lines, calls 
were reversed, that is, instead of Kenyan operators initiating calls, the 
calls would be initiated from abroad. Th e Association of Progressive 
Communications (APC) network of organizations was one of the 
principal upstream distribution supports for local email service 
providers. 
•  Phase 2 In this phase, awareness of the Internet increased and email was 
launched. A milestone workshop organized by the Telecommunica -
tions Foundation of Africa in July 1995 attracted ten email service 
 providers—a relatively high attendance, refl ecting a growing interest in 
understanding the new technology. Immediately after the workshop, 
KP&TC made its declaration that Internet services were an illegal use 
of leased lines. 
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•  Phase 3 In 1994 and 1995, the African Regional Centre for Computing 
launched a full Internet system with fi nancial support from the British 
Government’s Overseas Development Agency to pay for an interna-
tional leased line. With increased awareness, clear business opportuni-
ties were emerging and attracting private-sector businesses that wished 
to launch commercial Internet services. Regulatory and operational 
bottlenecks aff ected access to bandwidth, however, leading to very 
high costs of access for consumers. Th e role of the CSOs as suppliers 
of Internet services declined dramatically because of competition from 
commercial operators. Funding of Internet development also evolved, 
from donor funding to commercial funding by entrepreneurs. 
•  Phase 4 Since 2000, with the entry of the Communications 
Commission of Kenya (CCK) as the nation’s telecommunications reg-
ulator, the government has legally recognized the Internet and estab-
lished a proactive relationship with CCK as a development partner. 
Entry barriers in licensing and fees came down. Th e government also 
accepted the Internet as an integral tool for development. Challenges, 
however, have remained—emerging monopolies, access to rural areas, 
aff ordability, the high cost of equipment, and the lack of content. 
 It is clear that the evolution of the Internet in Kenya has been rapid, 
with fundamental changes aff ecting every stakeholder:
•  At the institutional level, this evolution has seen a decline in the infl u-
ence of the East African Internet Association (EAIA), a nonprofi t orga-
nization founded in 1995, that advocated and catalyzed the growth of 
the Internet to Telecommunications Service Providers of Kenya, a 
nonprofi t organization representing technology service providers, in 
order to address the Internet’s then-current operational problems. 
•  Th e evolution has seen the role of CSOs move from the supply side of 
services in 1992–1995 to the demand side. Today, the CSOs’ concern 
is to reach higher levels of equity of access in terms of aff ordability for 
rural areas and the poor and of application in governance. Th e private 
sector drives the supply side on a commercial basis. 
•  At the operational level, the dominance of the CSOs in driving the 
growth of the Internet before 1994 has given way to the private sector, 
and the effi  ciency of distribution of local mail has been addressed with 
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the launch of the Kenya Internet Exchange (an Internet exchange 
point launched by Kenyan ISPs in 2000 to cut costs by avoiding the 
use of expensive international links [mostly satellite at the time]). 
•  At the technology level, FidoNet technology dominated in 1994. 
Because of the high cost of international calls, operators reversed traffi  c 
to upstream ISPs on a periodic basis. Transmission was through 
KP&TC, low earth orbiting satellites, and high-frequency radio to 
rural areas. Th e technology has since changed to make use of online 
connectivity after the introduction of the Internet in 1995. 
 Internet Diffusion and Impacts of Disruptive 
Innovation 
 Network Establishment, from 1990 to 2000 
 Technology moved from FidoNet store-and-forward systems being 
polled by GreenNet in the UK every six hours to a 64-Kbps online link 
for the country and then to today’s high speeds of 1.7 Gbps over the 
submarine cables in 2015. End users could only reach 14 Kbps to poll 
into the FidoNet systems, which had a limited number of dial-in lines, 
all owned by KP&TC. Th ese have given way progressively from analog 
fi rst-generation (1G) systems to today’s fourth-generation (4G) systems 
as coaxial cables have been superseded by fi ber optics. 
 New technology has also seen disruptions and the consequent demise 
of planned projects. Regional telecommunications networks, Code 
Division Multiple Access, trunked radio, and paging networks are some 
of the planned projects that failed to take off . In addition, innovations 
have killed legacy technologies and businesses, including postal services, 
money transfers, and copper-line access. 
 Offl ine Technologies 
 FidoNet was the technology of choice in the early years, when a customer 
would have to compose an email message and send it from a computer 
with a modem to an internet service provider (ISP) server, where it was 
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stored. Th e email would be picked up only after the server had been polled, 
sometimes up to six hours later, by an upstream ISP (hence the “store-
and-forward” terminology). Th e upstream provider helping most of the 
NGOs in Africa at the time was GreenNet, established by the Association 
for Progressive Communications (Levey and Young  2002 ). Th e upstream 
provider would download all email destined for the various Kenya-based 
NGOs and distribute mail for their international clients. Given the very 
limited bandwidth, the mail consisted principally of text messages and, 
rarely, attachments—which had to be encoded by the sender, and then, 
decoded by the user. It was only after decoding that the user knew if the 
attachment was, for example, additional text or a spreadsheet. 
 Email set-up at the customer end was expensive. A customer had to 
invest in a computer, a modem, and a telephone line. Similarly, the ISPs 
had to invest in telephone lines 1 and modems for connectivity to their 
customers. With a teledensity of less than 1 % nationally, installing the 
telephone lines was a major barrier—not to mention that the modems 
had to be of a type approved by KP&TC (which, incidentally, did not 
have the skills needed to keep up with approvals for the ever-increasing 
array of new technologies). 
 Kenya had deployed mobile cellular in 1992 using Enhanced Total 
Access Communications System network technology, which—being ana-
log—could not support the Internet. 
 At USD9 per minute, tariff s for international calls were high—much 
higher than for a similar call from the UK to Kenya (hence the need to 
reverse calls so that charges were borne from the UK end). 
 With all these challenges, the email service was almost entirely for use by 
international NGOs operating in Kenya (such as the Environment Liaison 
Centre International [ELCI], African Organisation for Standardisation, 
and Mission Aviation Fellowship), which provided store-and-forward 
email services that were largely for communicating with their affi  liated 
organizations—and that were not available to the general public. ELCI was 
the fi rst to introduce email out of Kenya in 1990 (Levey and Young  2002 ). 
 In 1992, electronic mailing was being piloted at the University of 
Nairobi and the Kenya Medical Research Institute—the earliest local 
1  Th e African Regional Centre for Computing started with two dial-in lines. 
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encounters with email in Kenya’s academic circles (National Research 
Council  1996 ). 
 Outside the major organizations, the African Regional Centre for 
Computing came on board as a local NGO to off er services to other 
NGOs and commercial entities. Th e work of the Centre catapulted 
Kenya to online connectivity for the fi rst time in October 1995 on a 
32-Kbps link to the UK, setting the stage for disruptions that radically 
changed the communication systems in the country and slowly nibbled 
away the mighty KP&TC—whose response was not only to ignore the 
technology but also to attempt to block it entirely, a decision that has 
haunted the organization ever since. 
 Online Internet 
 October 1995 was a turning point in Kenya’s communications history, 
when a leased line connection was established, providing Internet for the 
fi rst time. At 32 Kbps, Kenya was at last connected to the Internet, and the 
dream of information sharing became a reality. Th e system’s bandwidth 
was low even for those days and not much for information gathering—but 
now, at least email did not have to wait to be polled up to six hours later. 
 Shortly thereafter and in quick succession, two ISPs serving the com-
mercial and personal markets—Africa Online (Prodigy USA) and Form- 
Net—started off ering service, and for the fi rst time, competition entered 
the market. By the end of 1995, the two each had a 64-Kbps link and 
100 lines to serve their clientele. Th is opened a fl oodgate of other opera-
tors, and by the end of 1995, more than 10 were advertising for services, 
and reported accounts totaled approximately 5000 (Aguyo  1997 ). 
 Sector Regulation Defi ning Connectivity 
 Kenya’s telecommunications sector was regulated under KP&TC Act 
Cap 411, promulgated in 1977. Under this Act, KP&TC was the exclu-
sive monopoly provider of telecommunications services. It enforced 
this monopoly with zeal and, when expedient, could spin off  services or 
licences to third parties at its discretion (GOK  1978 ). 
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 As an example, KP&TC sold its paging interest under a fi ve-year 
exclusive licence to a private company. Other services licensed included 
providers of customer-premises equipment, telephone bureaus, and 
Internet services. Th e discretion aff orded to KP&TC by the Act was used 
selectively to lock out competitors, and when necessary, to enforce its 
monopoly powers through the courts. On at least two occasions, entre-
preneurs were arraigned in court for operating radio communication ser-
vices without the approval of KP&TC. 
 As a monopoly, KP&TC controlled all telecommunications services. 
Th e emergence of an alternative communications system (albeit one 
using the same infrastructure) was threatening KP&TC’s stranglehold on 
the sector, which is why KP&TC could not support the new service and 
indeed went all out to stop its use in July 1995. Email services nevertheless 
continued to grow, but KP&TC’s actions created a very hostile environ-
ment. Th is had a negative impact especially on government email use and 
that of large corporate organizations. Indeed, the government banned the 
use of email and the Internet in its communications until 1999. 
 Eventually, however, the winds of change across East Africa seeking 
to dismantle monopoly telecommunications operators had a signifi cant 
impact in Kenya. In 1996, the government promulgated its fi rst policy 
envisaging competition among telecommunications services in a liberal-
ized environment (GOK  1996 ), and by 1999, parliament had enacted 
a legal framework that ushered in true competition (GOK  1998 ). Th e 
Internet now became fully recognized as a service for development. Th e 
year 1999 was therefore a turning point that unshackled the Internet and 
set the pace for Kenya’s growth in the coming decade. 
 Th e continuing challenges, however, were the continued control of 
international connectivity by Telkom Kenya and the last mile to the cus-
tomer, which the ISPs had to deal with until 2007. 
 Connectivity 
 In the early days, connectivity to customers and to international band-
width were controlled as a monopoly by KP&TC, and with KP&TC’s 
limited capacity, telephone lines were inadequate. Unfortunately, even 
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when they were available, the failure rate was extremely high, and leased 
lines were very expensive. 
 Because of the lack of the telecommunications services in rural areas, 
the only available options for reaching out to NGOs were the use of 
high-frequency radio and low earth orbiting satellites. HealthNet, for 
example, used low earth orbiting satellites extensively to reach out to 
its community-based-organization partners in rural areas (National 
Research Council  1996 ). 
 Agents and Market Responses 
 KP&TC managed the telecommunications system as a monopoly, with a 
total switching capacity of 380,000 lines and slightly more than 269,000 
connected customers as at the end of 1997. International services were sat-
ellite-based through Atlantic and Indian Ocean Intelsat satellites and two 
earth stations in the town of Longonot, Kenya. An additional earth station 
was built in the town of Kericho, Kenya, to serve Japan and later retooled 
to provide local satellite services by very-small-aperture terminals (VSATs). 
 At the end of 1997, Kenya had 77,163 people waiting for telephone 
services but was only capable of connecting 10,000–13,000 lines per 
year—implying that it would take more than 7 years to connect all the 
waiters (International Telecommunication Union  1998 ). Clearly this was 
a good time to facilitate the entry of fresh capital into the sector rather 
than crippling the local entrepreneurs. As of the end of April 1998, the 
number of waiters had increased to 80,000, and it was clear that unsatis-
fi ed demand existed in cellular, data services, and paging largely because 
of the monopolistic tariff s. 
 Th e network was creaking with age and obsolescence because of limited 
investment. Th e main switching exchange systems required urgent atten-
tion to replace old exchanges and transmission systems that had outlived 
their useful life and were therefore prone to failure. Several old exchange 
systems were upgraded. Th ese strategic communication facilities were 
running on obsolescent crossbar technology that was diffi  culty to sup-
port because spare parts were diffi  cult to procure. In total, 150,000 tele-
phones, or half of the total telecommunications network, were  connected 
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to exchanges based on old, obsolescent technology. It was just a matter 
of time before key parts failed and the system became disabled (Mureithi 
 1999 ). 
 In addition to age, the network suff ered from serious congestion 
because of its lack of expansion of facilities, making it diffi  cult to place 
calls, particularly in industrial areas. Lines to the customer were of copper 
wire and prone to damage by water, rodents, and cable theft. As a result, 
failure rates were high. On average, there were 186 faults for every 100 
telephones per year, which compared poorly with a world average of 5 
faults for every 100 telephones per year (International Telecommunication 
Union  1999 ). To address the high failure rate of the last mile, KP&TC 
launched Instafone, a fi xed wireless service designed to overcome faulty 
customer lines. 
 As in other public telecommunications networks in Africa, the domi-
nant product was voice telephony, followed by data services. Th ese 
brought in annual revenues of USD307 million in fi scal year 1996–1997, 
making KP&TC the fi fth largest operator in the Africa in revenue terms 
(International Telecommunication Union  1998 ). 
 Customer-Premises Equipment and Telephone Bureaus 
 Customer-premises equipment and telephone bureaus, including private 
automated branch exchange systems, terminal sets, and faxes, had been 
liberalized since 1991. Product availability and the easy mode of entry 
into the market segment had brought more than 245 companies into 
the customer-premises-equipment market, with tangible benefi ts for the 
consumer in terms of lower prices, better-quality products, and more 
reliable support. 
 In addition, KP&TC had also licensed 250 telephone bureaus, with 
many more operating without licences, particularly in residential areas. 
 Service Offerings That Supported the Emerging 
Internet 
 Th ree years after the Internet launch, Kenya was on track to develop ser-
vices that anchored the emerging Internet ecosystem. With its monopoly, 
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KP&TC continued to play a key role in complementing an emerging 
private sector. 
 Some of the key infrastructure provided by KP&TC included data 
services and leased lines. KP&TC had introduced Kenpac X25 (packet 
switched), available since May 1994, with a capacity of 1200 ports; ana-
log leased circuits; and KenStream (64 Kbps), with a capacity of 2000 
ports. By 1998, the analog leased lines in use had increased to 1695, and 
the digital lines had increased to 196 (64 Kbps). KP&TC also launched a 
national Internet backbone known as the East African Internet Exchange, 
with a capacity of up to 30,000 customers by 1998 intended to ensure 
that 90 % of the population would be within reach of the Internet at 
local call rates. 
 To complement the terrestrial infrastructure, which was severely lim-
ited, KP&TC launched Kensat (off ering VSAT) and Safarisat (off ering 
Inmarsat) satellite services. 
 Th e private sector exploited the KP&TC infrastructure by launching 
a range of ISPs, including the African Regional Centre for Computing, 
Africa Online, Form-Net, Inter-connect, Swift Global, Net 2000, 
NairobiNet, and Insight Technologies. Th is unleashed further competi-
tion, which brought down prices, increased the points of presence in all 
major towns, and generally raised Internet awareness. 
 Th e greatest challenge was the low level of locally relevant content 
on the Internet, and therefore, its utility in daily life. Another challenge 
was in the area of licensing and pricing of leased lines by KP&TC. ISPs 
had to pay an initial fi ve-year operating licence fee of USD8330 and 
an annual operating fee of USD4200. Kenya restricted the use of satel-
lite technologies (e.g., VSAT) that would otherwise have off ered cheaper 
international connectivity and provided more capacity to ISPs than was 
available through KP&TC. Th e restriction was to safeguard KP&TC’s 
monopoly on international connectivity. 
 Interest in the Internet was growing. Kenya had 458 Internet hosts—
the highest number in any country in Sub-Saharan Africa (International 
Telecommunication Union  1998 ). Th e number of email accounts was 
estimated at 20,000 and growing rapidly. Th e total number of dial-up 
lines was estimated at 600, and the number of .ke domain names at 292. 
 Cost was also a major barrier in the early years. Th e costs for Internet 
dial-up service included installation at USD20, monthly charges of 
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USD72, and an hourly use rate of USD5. Use of Internet bureaus was 
equally expensive, with a fee of USD0.20 per minute. At the same time, 
access to computers was very limited, because of costs and numbers. By 
1997, the estimated number of computers in the country was 50,000 
(Aguyo  1997 ). 
 Th e greatest handicap for the development of Internet services was the 
regulatory restrictions they faced. Access to customers and international 
bandwidth had to go through Telkom Kenya. ISPs had very little leeway 
on quality of service to consumers and on input costs—and hence had 
limited marketing leverage—as well as limited means for innovation. 
 Implications for the Knowledge Industry 
 Because of the poor infrastructure, the access to, sharing, and storage 
of information were all still manual. And even with the arrival of the 
Internet, access to information was still limited because of the lim-
ited capacity of the links—with the result that information access was 
very expensive. Yet the dream of an information society was alive and 
growing. 
 Th e downloading of large fi les (around 1 MB in those days), especially 
presentations with graphics, was a nightmare, often taking hours. Users 
had to visit ISPs for assistance in downloading such fi les onto fl oppy 
disks, Internet surfi ng was discouraging because of the limited informa-
tion on the Net, search engines like AltaVista were problematic, and any 
useful information had to be downloaded immediately because one could 
not be sure of getting it again on the Net! (Today’s Google had yet to 
come into the market.) 
 Internet Evolution from 2000 to 2010 
 Th e decade from 2000 to 2010 unleashed the full capacities of the 
Internet. By the end of 2000, it was clear that local Internet traffi  c was 
increasing rapidly but had to be switched from overseas at great cost. Th e 
ISPs therefore made the pioneering decision to build the Kenya Internet 
Exchange to switch local traffi  c. Unfortunately, it was shut down by the 
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regulators for an entire year on the grounds that the traffi  c exchanged 
through it contravened the exclusivity of Telkom Kenya. 
 Finally, with the entry of second-generation (2G) digital cellular com-
munications, it became feasible to use an alternative for carrying Internet 
traffi  c through General Packet Radio Service. In line with the existing 
market structure, cellular operators could not be licensed as ISPs and 
therefore had to transit their email traffi  c through other licensed ISPs. 
 In 2007, the curtain came down on Telkom Kenya’s monopoly on 
international gateway, which brought down many barriers to the Internet. 
Evolution was driven through connectivity via submarine fi ber optic 
cables in 2009, liberalized international gateways and last- and fi rst-mile 
solutions, and fi nally, the convergence in services. 
 Th e government came back into the market with initiatives to inter-
vene in areas the private sector was not addressing, specifi cally in rural 
areas and in international connectivity. In this regard, the government 
invested in international submarine fi ber optic cables and national fi ber 
connectivity. In addition, the decade saw activities that helped entrench 
the Internet. Th ese included infrastructure to develop data centers, eff orts 
in the domain name space, and government intervention on costs to end- 
user terminals by the elimination of certain taxes. Th e decade, in short, 
ushered the Internet onto a high-growth path. 
 Geographical: Network Coverage 
 At the advent of email and the Internet in Kenya, the access to the Internet 
was restricted to the availability of copper lines. With under 300,000 
lines nationally (80 % in the urban areas), this access was severely lim-
ited. Cellular in the early years since 1992 was analog, and the emergence 
of the GSM standard in 1995 was exclusively voice. It was only on the 
introduction of General Packet Radio Service in 2002 that an alternative 
last mile was fi nally introduced in the market. 
 Fast growth in cellular rapidly increased the customer based in 2001, 
as cellular connections overtook fi xed lines. Th is was a typical market 
disruption, with cellular becoming the platform for Internet access going 
forward. Th e rapid growth of cellular with improved technologies from 
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2G to 4G and widespread coverage has continued to enhance the Internet 
experience. From nine base stations in 1995 covering Nairobi City 
Centre, coverage today is nationwide, reaching 90 % of the population. 
 Lessons from the Internet Revolution 
 Th e Internet evolution has presented some key lessons: 
 Disruption Is the Sweetener That Drives Change 
 A dynamic environment that spawned disruption and was not limited to 
the technologies and processes but also included the actors was a key to 
change. Internet advocacy has seen a large turnover among CSOs because 
of disruptive pathways to enabling policies. Government-imposed bar-
riers that spawned innovations included banning the Internet outright, 
closing the Kenya Internet Exchange, and imposing punitive costs. 
 Defensiveness was a principal barrier thrown up by the incumbents as 
they defended their positions—sparking innovation and market disrup-
tion. Th is behavior has been consistent and keeps refreshing the market 
with new and improved services at lower costs. 
 Disruptive Innovation Is the Weapon against Big 
Players 
 Th e Internet introduced by the African Regional Centre for Computing 
was a game changer, and today, all the organizations that did not change 
have been killed by it. 
 Disruption Is a Deadly Game 
 Many of those who innovated and disrupted others were to undergo the 
same trials themselves eventually, and unless they transformed themselves 
in turn, they fell by the wayside. Today, only Wananchi Online still exists 
as an entity. 
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 An Agent Is Critical for the Game Change 
 CSOs were the pioneer developers and promoters of email service provision 
in the mid-1990s. After establishing the business case, the private sector 
came on board and commercialized the Internet—in the process, pushing 
out the CSOs from an operational role. Th e CSOs took on a new role in 
expanding the service, with particular focus on the demand side, based on 
their advocacy of empowerment, access rights, and personal development. 
 The Agent Itself Must Change Tactics 
 Th e role of CSOs has changed radically from that of developer and pro-
moters to that of advocates. Th e rapid evolution of the technology and 
business models has spawned the rapid rise and fall of the CSOs. None of 
the CSOs existing in the early days still exist today, except the Computer 
Society of Kenya. Typical CSOs are cited in Table  2.1 .
 Table 2.1  Civil society organizations driving Internet evolution 
 CSO  Mission 
 East African Internet Association  Introduce the Internet in the country 
 Kenya National ICT forum  Contribute to formulation of ICT policy 
 National E-Commerce Task Force  Lobby the government on the 
implementation of e-commerce 
 Telecommunications Dealers 
Association of Kenya 
 Bring down the cost of telecom 
accessories 
 Kenya Information Society  Catalyze the growth of an information 
society 
 Telecommunications User Association  Lobby for service-level agreements with 
providers 
 Information Technology Standards 
Association 
 Foster IT standards 
 Computer Society of Kenya  Make information technology more 
accessible 
 Telecommunications Service 
Providers of Kenya a 
 Liberalize Internet provision 
 Linux Chix  Promote women in computing and the 
use of open source 
 a Rebranded in November 2015 as the technology service providers of Kenya 
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 Th e demise of the various CSOs was caused by their narrow focus in 
the market, and once their issues were addressed, their reasons for exis-
tence ceased. 
 Th e Kenyan government has come full circle, from being dead set 
against the Internet in the mid-1990s to embracing it as a key tool for 
development, and now, intervening in areas that the private sector is not 
willing to venture into. 
 Conclusion 
 Twenty years of Internet evolution have propelled Kenyans to the edges 
of a knowledge society and empowered them in profound ways in how 
they relate, conduct business, and even structure their society. Th e turn-
ing points in this evolution have always revealed passionate individuals out 
over the stumbling blocks ahead, whether they were of a regulatory nature 
or the suff ering of their fellow citizens caused by lack of services. Th is com-
bination has been instrumental in disrupting business processes and tech-
nologies that did not address societal needs, thereby releasing the power of 
innovation. Th is is the power Kenyans need to harness in order to sustain 
their momentum and to continue to lead as an innovation hub for Africa. 
 At the same time, the fast growth has spawned growing disparities in 
Internet use and benefi ts to society—including a gender gap (because more 
men than women use the Internet), a poverty gap (when cost becomes a 
barrier to access), and an urban–rural gap (because those in rural areas are 
worse off ). Th ese gaps will continue to be a challenge in the next decade. 
But to judge from the experiences of the past 20 years, they will provide the 
fertile ground to inspire innovation and new disruptive business processes 
that can close the gaps and propel all Kenyans into the knowledge society. 
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 Conversation #2 
 Exploring the Ideal Role of Government, 
NGOs, Angel Investors, and Universities for 
Technology Entrepreneurs 
 Erik Hersman of BRCK 
 Erik Hersman  is an entrepreneur and technologist focused on advanc-
ing the use of technology in Africa. He is the chief executive oﬃ  cer (CEO) 
of BRCK ,  makers of a wireless WiFi device designed and engineered in 
Kenya for use in emerging markets. In 2010, he founded the iHub ,  a 
pioneering innovation hub in Nairobi for the technology community , 
 bringing together entrepreneurs ,  hackers ,  designers ,  and the investment 
community. He is also a co-founder of Ushahidi ( “ witness ”  in Kiswahili) , 
 a nonproﬁ t company whose free open-source software is used to collect 
and map information for crowdsourcing ,  social activism ,  and public 
accountability ;  and of afrigadget.com and whiteafrican.com ,  online 
communities that explore Africa ’ s creative solutions ,  entrepreneurship , 
 and development challenges. He is also a general partner in the Savannah 
Fund and sits on the boards of Akirachix ,  Angani ,  the Kijabe Forest 
Trust ,  and the Whitaker Peace and Development Initiative. You can 
ﬁ nd him on Twitter at @ WhiteAfrican. 
 Erik, you are wearing multiple hats in Kenya’s ICT sector. What is the 
story behind that? 
 What gives me the right to do what I do rather than anybody else is 
actually what it comes down to. Well, nothing—besides that I am the 
one who did it, right? Anybody can do the same things I do! It just takes 
your desire and ability to champion something. I will go back into some 
of the history. So if you look back to 2005, that is when I started blog-
ging about tech in Africa. Fast-forward three years from that, I had writ-
ten about a lot of start-ups, I knew a lot of people, and I was part of the 
blogging ecosystem that was really burgeoning at that time. So it was a 
network of people who knew each other. 
 Th en, we came across the post-election violence and craziness that 
were happening after the elections. Ushahidi was formed, and I was one 
of the founders. I remember that I came to Nairobi in August of 2008 
and was sitting down with a bunch of other guys at BarCamp Nairobi. 
Th ere was a large turnout. A great amount of interest, and there was 
everybody present. All the guys who are now CEOs of their own start-
ups in the ecosystem, but we were still just ordinary tech guys at the 
time. 
 So, we were sitting around afterward, and we were saying, “Why is it 
that the tech guys in the city only meet up once or twice a year at these 
events? What if we had a place of our own?” And that was the seed that 
would eventually grow to become the iHub. So why did not somebody 
else do the iHub? Because it is a lot of work to come up with the money, 
to come up with the bigger vision of where this thing needs to be. And 
keep in mind that I was running operations for Ushahidi at that time, 
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and actually through all of my time running the iHub, I still did. It is 
the ability to and the desire to champion an idea, even though there are 
way too many excuses not to do it. So how do you still push that idea 
forward beyond what your normal day-to-day job is? I think that is the 
biggest challenge. Look across the continent. Look at the people who 
are leading the tech hubs, generally. Th ey are champions of the idea that 
we can build something together that is greater than any one of us and 
brings us all together in a diff erent way. It is a desire to champion the 
idea and do the hard, scrappy work to get people together and convince 
people to show up for meetings and do all those little, oftentimes unno-
ticed things. 
 Th e iHub started, and that was after we talked to many people, asking, 
“Hey, will you give us some money for this or that and the other thing?” 
Nobody wanted to give us any money. Google and Nokia at the time, 
you name it. Nobody wanted to give us money. So fi nally, as Ushahidi, 
we sat down and said, “Listen, as Ushahidi, we can be a really good vector 
for the money that is needed for the iHub.” And so that is what we did. 
Omidyar Network and Hivos funded Ushahidi and we built the founda-
tions for the iHub with that. 
 But very early on, even before we had the space, I went out to people 
that were in the tech community already, that were my peers and people 
I respected and who were also respected by the general community—
people like Becky Wanjiku, Conrad Akunga, Riyaz Bachani, and Josiah 
Mugambi. I said, “Hey, will you be the iHub advisors alongside me and 
help make the big decisions in the iHub’s future, for the community?” 
We cannot make everything a purely democratic, everybody-votes-on-it 
process, but we can have a group of us who will help make some of the 
bigger decisions. And so, that was what we did. 
 When we fi rst launched the iHub in March of 2010, Conrad Akunga 
told everybody, “Listen, here is the foundation. What gets built on top 
of this is up to you. Now, it’s over to the rest of the community to help 
make this community what it is.” And I think that is the kind of magic 
that makes the iHub, compared to most of the other tech hubs that are 
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focused on incubation and other things. It is about the idea that we, as 
a community, need to be connected to each other and we need a space. 
We need a place, we need a meeting space that will allow us to almost 
accidentally fi nd each other from time to time, which will draw us in and 
connect us in ways that would not exist if we did not have it. 
 After Ushahidi and the iHub came Savannah Fund and BRCK. How 
do they ﬁ t into the picture? 
 I think this is oftentimes deceptive. Th ere are teams built around each 
of these ventures. Teams that are actually more involved in operations 
than I am. What happens is that there are obvious gaps in the market that 
need to be addressed. And if I put my name behind it, with, for example, 
Savannah Fund or with some other initiative—Gearbox is a newer one—
it is not so much that I do anything day to day on it. I will sit there in 
board meetings and help with the ideation, the formation, the  governance 
structure, but I do not have to be involved in the operations. It is more 
about fi nding the right people who capture the right vision of it. 
 So what hats do I wear? Now, I no longer wear this hat, but one that 
is relevant here was forming the Afrilabs Association and being the fi rst 
chair for the initial years before passing it on. Th ere is the Savannah Fund 
and being a general partner in it, but Mbwana Alliy actually runs it day 
to day. Th ere is forming Gearbox, being on the board and helping create, 
but Kamau Gachigi leads it day to day. Th ere is AkiraChix, which was 
the women in this community who built the whole thing, and they just 
asked me to join the board when they became an offi  cial organization 
three years into it. 
 And there is BRCK, which I spend 90 % of my time on. I focus on 
BRCK because it is a venture-backed, for-profi t company. All the other 
things take up that other 10 %, where I am just dipping in and helping as 
needed. Th e most valuable thing about me in each of these things is that, 
by being a part of it, I can either use my knowledge, network, or experi-
ence to help make decisions better and faster, but more importantly, I can 
help push things to actually get them done. Th ere are a lot of people who 
talk about things, and there are very few people who do them. 
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 Erik, there is a lot of controversy about government intervention into 
private-sector activities. What is your take? What should be the ideal 
role of government? 
 So the role of the government is very simple: To reduce friction in the 
system for the technology industry to grow. What does that break down 
into? It breaks down into regulation that is actually good for business—
speed of setting up business, tax breaks for new companies, things like 
that. Another example of friction in the system that does not need to exist 
is legacy laws that are 30 to 40 years old and put a 20 to 30 % duty on 
components imported into the country. I can import a fully assembled, 
packaged BRCK duty free. Yet the components to make it have a heavy 
import duty—which means it does not make sense to import. In other 
words, I cannot create a new manufacturing industry in Kenya if we do 
not have the ability to bring in raw materials that are not produced in 
Kenya. Like this, we never will create industries unless we change these 
legacy laws. So again, government’s job is to reduce friction. And by 
reducing friction, they increase wealth and they increase jobs. 
 Th en there are other things, such as providing foundational access, of 
which the subsidization of the undersea cable by the government was a 
massive example. Th at is exactly what the government should be doing, 
massive projects that bring in both the public and private sectors and 
help things move further. Another one is regulation around spectrum 
allocation or licencing. 
 How about foreign aid and NGOs? What should their role be? 
 In a well-functioning state, most NGOs would not exist. Th ere is only a 
limited role for them, because the market answers many of the problems, 
and the government should answer the rest. However, here in Kenya, 
we have one of the highest count of NGOs per capita in the world. It 
is an interesting dynamic though, because international NGOs bring in 
money for some things, which bastardizes the market for other things. It 
creates a whole realm of craziness that you would not fi nd in other places. 
 Let me give you an example. NGOs build bridges that after two years 
become dysfunctional. Th is cost a few million US dollars to make, and 
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after two years, is no longer relevant. Other examples are new livestock 
programs in northern Kenya that only work as long as the NGO  workers 
are there. As soon as they leave, it all falls apart. Th ese are the kinds of 
things that we have seen for fi ve decades now, and it does not seem to stop. 
 Now, if a business had this high of a failure rate, they would not keep 
operating. NGOs, however, seem to have a limitless amount of money 
that comes from unilateral and bilateral aid and just keeps on coming 
in. NGOs keep on having to fund something, and it goes a bit like this: 
“Oh, let’s quickly procure something, because, shoot, we gotta spend this 
money before the end of the year.” Or, “Hey, let’s go fund innovation!” 
Not knowing what “innovation” means to them. Th ey know that 80 to 
90 % of the money will be absorbed in overhead and HR costs instead of 
the innovation that the NGOs say they are going to fund. If you want to 
see innovation happen, then fi nd vehicles where people are already doing 
interesting stuff  and dump money into the companies that are growing 
great things and trying new models. 
 Having said all that, I think there actually is a role where international 
NGOs can help, and that is with government. Th at is, funding some of 
the regulatory research. Research so that laws can be made or something 
like public–private partnerships on large-scale intra-country projects, 
such as installing terrestrial cables. Helping to subsidize some of that stuff  
as it gets built out across the country is valuable, and if it can reduce some 
of the load on the government, then, sure, that can work. 
 As someone who runs a for-profi t company, if someone wants to pro-
vide you with grant funding, you look at all that is going on in the market 
and you are to decide if it fi ts the company’s focus and mission. I will 
take the free money if you hand it to me, but it has to be aligned with 
what I am trying to do. You need to dump money into me because what 
I am doing is great, not because what you are doing is great and you want 
me to do it for you. Th is type of decision is hard for younger executives, 
because it comes with some experience. If you are a leader of a company, 
you have to be strong enough to make the right call for your company. 
And if you are not making the right call and take a grant that does not 
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make sense for your company, well, that is on you. Do not blame an 
industry because you made a bad decision. 
 Angel investors are crucial in funding the ideational phase of a busi-
ness. What is the current state in Kenya? 
 For angels investors, those who have signifi cant-enough disposable 
income to risk on investing, in Kenya it is a lot easier to put money into 
something like property and real estate. Th at is because we are seeing year-
on-year growth of that. It is just astronomical! So it tends to be a smart 
decision to put your money into those things. What we are starting to 
see, however, are people in business who have made enough money that 
they are willing to diversify their portfolio out of just real estate. Where 
it has changed over the past two to three years is that we are seeing a few 
more people willing to dabble in tech investments locally. It is not large 
money—maybe USD25,000 here, USD100,000 there—but it is enough 
to get some companies off  the ground. Th is will continue once angel inves-
tors start seeing a little bit of success, and this will bring in more of their 
peers. 
 Local angel investors can bring to the table more than what outside 
investors can off er. Outside investors largely bring in money and experi-
ence for early-stage company growth, strategy, and management. Th at is 
all good. But what they do not bring is connections to other businesses 
here in Kenya. Connections can immediately increase the share value of 
the business that the angels have invested in, and so, making the right 
introductions to CEOs or other companies is powerful. Th e problem 
currently is that angel money in Kenya is usually too expensive compared 
to money from abroad. If you have an investor coming in from the USA, 
they will give you USD50,000 and take 15 % of your early-stage, pre- 
revenue company. Th e Kenyan angel will give you USD50,000 and want 
50 % of your company, if not more. We need to fi nd a balance where we 
decrease the cost of equity-based money from local angel investors and 
increase the knowledge base and connectivity of the money for outside 
investors. It should not just be money invested in a company. What actu-
ally needs to happen is that you are investing mentally and physically in 
the start-up in order to help it grow their company. 
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 How do you see the current state of human capital development in 
Kenya for the next generation of entrepreneurs? 
 I do not think universities will be the answer; at least, I have not seen 
them work for technology education. Graduates fresh out of university 
are, in general, not prepared to work in a technology company. Th ey are 
not coming out of these institutions with the necessary skills. Th e people 
who do are usually the ones that are self-taught. Th at is quite disappoint-
ing. Th e universities in Kenya are too bureaucratic and not teaching the 
right stuff  in the classes. Not across the board, but generally, students 
still learn the same computer languages that they were being taught eight 
years ago, even though current technology has changed. 
 Why are people still learning these things? And why are they not being 
challenged to learn new things? And why are university professors not the 
ones leading the charge on this? I like what the Moringa School is doing, 
and I like what a couple of the fi nishing schools for software engineers 
are doing. I think that is an interesting model and where we will see more 
hiring happen in the future. 
 I love bringing on people into my own company. Th e young people 
who have been self-taught and have a raw sense of what they should do. 
A raw skill set which allows building and growing them in my company. 
I think on-the-job training—whether it is for the Mike Macharias and 
Seven Seas of the world, or Safaricom, or Google, or IBM, or M-Kopa, 
or Intel—is actually one of the benefi ts of Nairobi. We have enough of 
those medium and large companies, and this is what sets us apart from 
Kampala and Kigali and Dar es Salaam. When you come out of univer-
sity or even without university, you can get a job with Conrad Akunga or 
myself in our smaller companies. You can get a job with Mike Macharia 
at his company or with John Waibochi over at Virtual City or with any 
number of the smaller fi ve-to-ten-person-size startups scattered across the 
city. Th ere are a number of tech companies from small to large that are 
accessible to you, whereas they are not accessible in some of these other 
cities. Th e off take of that is amazing. It means that there are more and 
more people who are being polished into seeing technology as a business 
opportunity. Th ey develop an important and unique skill set. Th is does 
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not necessarily happen in other places, simply because others do not have 
the critical mass of companies to even hire them. 
 Reﬂ ecting upon the past years, can you point out one of the biggest 
“Aha!” moments that you have had? 
 I think it is diff erent for each stage when you are part of growing an 
ecosystem. I have been here for fi ve and half years now. Th ere are dif-
ferent things that happen throughout that time, and there are diff erent 
things that matter, depending on the stage that we were in. Th e fi rst 
“Aha!” moment was that this little idea of having a physical space would 
be good for the community. Th e “Aha!” moment was, “Holy crap, we’re 
oversubscribed by 2,000 people and, yeah, it worked.” Th e insight was 
this—that, yes, actual face time with people is important, even for 
technologists! 
 I had a conversation with Eric Schmidt of Google on his visit a couple 
years back. We were sitting downstairs grabbing lunch at Pete’s, and I 
mentioned the numbers we were seeing and the success rates of those 
companies being around 10 to 15 % for their fi rst year. He responded 
that in Silicon Valley, the numbers are much, much higher, but the suc-
cess rates are even lower—meaning that we should expect to put out 
many more companies if we want to see a few succeed at a very large level. 
Th is was the “Aha!” moment tied to the need to generate more start-ups. 
It is a numbers game. So how do we help get more things started? 
 We understand many will fail and that is fi ne. But the more we get 
out there, the better. It is like if you want the real, sort of bigger investors 
to come off  the sidelines and jump into the system for more start-ups to 
scale, then we need at least one of them to exit at maybe USD20 million 
in order to prove to people that there is something here. Th at is what the 
ecosystem is fi guring out right now. 
 For the iHub, the “Aha!” moment came as we realized that we did not 
have to charge our members if we come up with a service model that 
allows us to charge for other services, such as consulting. Th at is why we 
built the iHub Research arm, the UX Lab, and iHub Consulting. Th ese 
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new departments allowed the iHub to be 85 % self-sustaining, generat-
ing its own revenue and still fulfi ll its mission of catalyzing the tech com-
munity in Nairobi. 
 I have realized over time that as you are fi guring things out, it is impor-
tant to be open to the idea that you really are experimenting and impro-
vising a lot of the time. And if things do not work, you stop them. And if 
they do work, double down on them, and hopefully, it turns into another 
“Aha!” moment. 
 Th ank you, Erik! 
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